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1. Introduction 
Starting in the 1980s, there has been a substantial decline in the share of wages in national 
income in the majority of the European countries. In contrast to conventional wisdom, this 
development was associated with a poor growth performance in most European countries. 
Indeed, the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2007 and slow recovery in the aftermath shed 
light on the limitations of the conventional growth strategy of Europe that claims wage 
moderation, i.e. real wage growth below the rate of growth in labour productivity, would lead 
to a more productive and dynamic economic system with enhanced growth performance as is 
repeatedly advocated by the European Commission (EC, 2006). In contrast, Post-Keynesian 
models of distribution and growth demonstrate that the relationship between the wage share 
and growth is an empirical matter, which depends on the structural characteristics of the 
economy.  
The significant fall in the wage share has also been associated with increasing personal 
income inequality. Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) show that changes in the factor 
distribution of income are an important explanatory determinant of personal income inequality. 
Similarly, Atkinson (2009) argues that analysing changes in functional income distribution is 
crucial to understand trends of increasing dispersion in personal incomes. In the rest of the 
paper, we will focus on changes in functional income distribution, which allows us to aggregate 
the effects of increasing inequality on demand.  
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of a pro-capital 
redistribution of income on growth in the EU15 countries. The model estimated in this paper 
is similar to the spirit of the post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian demand-led growth model 
developed by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), and aims at analysing the effects of a change in the 
wage share on growth. A priori one would expect a falling wage share, i.e. a rising profit share, 
to have negative effects on consumption, since the marginal propensity to consume out of wage 
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income is higher than that out of profit income, but positive effects on investment and net 
exports. However, the question whether the negative effect of an increasing profit share on 
consumption overpowers the positive effects on investment and net exports essentially 
becomes an empirical one, depending on the relative size of the consumption differential, the 
sensitivity of investment to profit and the sensitivity of net exports to unit labour costs. If the 
total effect is negative, the demand regime is called wage-led; otherwise it is profit-led.  
The post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian theoretical framework highlights the central role 
of demand in determining growth in economies operating below full employment and points 
out the dual role of wages as a cost item to the firm but also as a source of demand in the 
economy. The flexible framework provided by the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) model, which 
allows for both wage-led and profit-led demand regimes, lets us illuminate whether it is 
possible to promote higher growth with a more equitable income distribution in the case of 
Europe. Furthermore, by developing a multi-country model, we analyse whether coordinated 
wage policies present a feasible alternative to the European strategy of wage restraint.  
The novelty of this paper is that it integrates cross-country effects of a simultaneous 
decline in the wage share on demand in Europe. Previous studies have only analysed a subset 
of European countries1 (i.e. Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Storm and Naastepad, 2012; Hein and 
Vogel 2008; Bowles and Boyer, 1995) or taken the Euro area (twelve West European member 
states) as a hypothetical aggregate economy without considering cross-country interactions 
(Stockhammer et al., 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, Onaran 
and Galanis (2014) were the first to develop a theoretical and empirical multi-country model 
for the G20 countries, which inspired the empirical model in this paper.  
                                                          
1 Countries covered in the cited studies include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
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We first provide new estimates for some individual EU15 countries previously not covered in 
the empirical literature. Second, we go beyond the nation state analysing the effects of a 
simultaneous fall in the wage share and its impact on growth in a highly integrated European 
economy. Third, we present different wage-led recovery scenarios and further effects of an 
increase in the wage share on prices, nominal unit labour costs, nominal wages, investment, 
and net exports.  
We first estimate the effects of a change in the wage share on individual components 
of private aggregate demand, which are consumption, investment and net exports for each 
EU15 country in isolation. Next, we calculate the effects of a simultaneous decline in the wage 
share, as has been the case in the majority of countries in the post-1980s. Finally, we estimate 
the response of each country to not only the domestic wage share but also the trade partners’ 
wage share, which affects the import prices and foreign demand of each country.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents data and stylised facts. Section 3 
presents the theoretical model. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimation methodology and results. 
Section 6 compares the findings to the empirical literature and section 7 presents different 
wage-led recovery scenarios and further effects. Section 8 summarises the key findings and 
discusses policy conclusions.  
 
2. Data and Stylized Facts 
 
The definitions, calculations and sources of the variables in the model are presented in appendix 
A. C, I, X, M, Y, W and R are consumption expenditures, private investment expenditures, 
exports, imports, GDP, adjusted wages and adjusted profits, all variables are in real terms.  
Profit share, 𝜋, is adjusted gross operating surplus as a ratio to GDP at factor cost, 𝑌𝑓; 
wage share, 𝑤𝑠, is 1 − 𝜋. Returns from self-employment income in national accounts accrue 
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to capital income and hence leads to lower wage shares, particularly in countries where self-
employment income plays a significant part in the economy. The adjusted wage share allocates 
a labour compensation for each self-employed equivalent to the average compensation of the 
dependent employees2. The sample is restricted to EU15 countries3, due to a lack of sufficient 
time series data for the new EU member states. The sample period is 1960-2013.  
Figure 1 shows the wage share (in percentages) in the EU15 countries. There is an 
overall decline in the wage share in the majority of the countries, particularly pronounced 
between the early 1980s and mid-2000s. The fall is more moderate in Belgium, Denmark, and 
Luxembourg. In the UK, the fall in the 𝑤𝑠 is relatively lower. However, this may be due to a 
sharp increase in managerial income (OECD, 2012). Greece experienced a pronounced fall in 
the 1960s coming to a stop with the ending of the military dictatorship in the mid-1970s. 
Portugal exhibits an exceptional upswing followed by a significant downswing during the 
revolutionary period between 1974 and 1976 (Lagoa et al., 2014). Luxembourg, as an outlier, 
exhibits a significant increase starting in the early 1970s followed by a moderate decline after 
the early 1980s.  
Overall, the share of wages in national income has declined by roughly 10 percentage 
points in the EU15 countries between their latest peak levels (in the mid-1970s or early 1980s) 
and 2013. 
Appendix B Table B1 presents average annual growth rates of GDP for 6 sub periods 
and shows that the secular decline in the wage share was associated with a weaker growth 
performance. For instance, average growth in France declined from 5.7% in the 1960s to 
roughly 2% in the 1990s. In Italy, average growth dropped significantly from almost 6% in the 
1960s to roughly 1.5% in the 1990s. This trend holds true for the majority of countries. 
                                                          
2 This methodology is used by the European Commission to calculate the adjusted labour share.   
3Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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However, growth rates increased in the case of Ireland and Luxembourg. In the 1990s, Ireland 
experienced high growth rates of almost 7% followed by a slight decline to 5.5% in the 2000s, 
until the Great Recession in 2008. In the UK, average growth remained relatively stable, with 
values between 2% and 3% between the 1960s and 2000s. Overall, growth in the EU15 has 
declined along with the lower wage share since the 1980s.  
It has often been argued that job creation requires wage moderation. However, the 
association of a lower wage share with weaker GDP growth does not provide evidence in 
favour of wage-suppression policies.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
3. The Theoretical Model 
 
We model the effects of a change in the profit share on growth by analysing the country level 
effects on the components of private aggregate demand: consumption, investment, exports and 
imports. We then estimate European interactions resulting from the effects of a change in the 
profit share of other EU15 countries. The model is post-Kaleckian, however, the behavioural 
functions also encompass standard Keynesian models (Blanchard, 2006). 
Consumption is commonly estimated as a function of income. In order to include the 
distributional effects, we estimate Consumption (C) as a function of adjusted profits (R) and 
adjusted wages (W)4: 
                                             𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅 + 𝑐𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊                         (1) 
 
                                                          
4 All variables will be used in logarithmic form due to the fact that they exhibit exponential growth.  
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We calculate the marginal effects of a change in the profit share on 𝐶 through multiplying the 
estimated coefficients (elasticities) of 𝑅 and 𝑊 by mean values of our sample 𝐶/𝑅 and 𝐶/𝑊 
respectively.  
                                                        
∆(𝐶/𝑌)
∆(𝜋)
= 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
𝑅
− 𝑐𝑊
𝐶
𝑊
                               (2) 
The estimates are equivalent to the difference in marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out 
of profits and wages, and are expected to be negative.  
 
Private Investment (I) is modelled as a positive function of output (accelerator effect) and the 
profit share as an indicator for expected profitability as well as for the availability of internal 
finance: 
                                                  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼 = 𝑖𝐴 + 𝑖𝑌𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌 + 𝑖𝜋𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋 + 𝑖𝑟𝑟                       
(3) 
 
where 𝑖𝐴 is autonomous investment, 𝑌 is real output, 𝜋 is the profit share and all parameters 
are expected to be positive. As a control variable, we include real long-term interest rate 𝑟 that 
represents a cost factor and is expected to have negative effects on investment5. The marginal 
effect of 𝜋 on 𝐼 𝑌⁄  is calculated as follows: 
                                                                     
∆(𝐼/𝑌)
 ∆(𝜋)
= 𝑖𝜋
𝐼
𝑅
                            
(4) 
The details of the derivation of the marginal affects can be found in appendix C. 
 
                                                          
5 We do not take log of the real interest rate since it includes negative values. 
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We model the effects of distribution on net exports using a stepwise approach that follows 
Stockhammer et al. (2009), Onaran et al. (2011) and Onaran and Galanis (2014). First, domestic 
prices (𝑃) and export prices (𝑃𝑥) are a function of nominal unit labour costs and import prices 
based on a mark-up pricing model in an imperfectly competitive economy. 
 
                         𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 =  𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑐log (𝑢𝑙𝑐) +  𝑝𝑚log (𝑃𝑚)                                        (5) 
                  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑥 =  𝑝𝑥0 + 𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑐log (𝑢𝑙𝑐) +  𝑝𝑚log (𝑃𝑚)                                    (6) 
 
where 𝑢𝑙𝑐 is nominal unit labour costs and 𝑃𝑚 is import prices, as a proxy for non-labour input 
costs and all parameters are expected to be positive. 
   
Exports (X) are a function of relative prices and GDP of the rest of the world: 
                       log𝑋 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥𝑝𝑥𝑚log (𝑃𝑥 𝑃𝑚⁄ ) + 𝑥𝑌𝑟𝑤log (𝑌𝑟𝑤) + 𝑥𝑒log (𝐸)              (7) 
 
where 𝑃𝑥/𝑃𝑚 are relative prices of exports to imports and 𝑌𝑟𝑤 is the GDP of the rest of the 
world. We include exchange rate, 𝐸, as a control variable.  
 
Imports (𝑀) are a function of relative prices and domestic GDP. 
                𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀 = 𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚log (𝑃 𝑃𝑚⁄ ) + 𝑚𝑌log (𝑌) + 𝑚𝑒log (𝐸)                   (8) 
 
where 𝑃/𝑃𝑚 is domestic prices relative to import prices and 𝑌 represents domestic GDP. 
Again, we include exchange rate 𝐸 as a control variable.  
 
We calculate the marginal effect of a change in the profit share on exports/GDP as follows: 
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∆(
𝑋
𝑌
)
 ∆(𝜋)
= (−) (
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑥
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑥
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑠)
)
𝑋/𝑌
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
= (−) (𝑒𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑃𝑥
1
1−𝑒𝑃
𝑌𝑓
𝑌
)
𝑋/𝑌
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
           (9) 
 
where 𝑒𝑃𝑥 illustrates the effect of nominal unit labour costs (𝑢𝑙𝑐) on 𝑃𝑥 and 𝑒𝑋𝑃 is the effect of 
𝑃𝑥 on exports. The wage share is real unit labour costs (𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐) multiplied by GDP at market 
prices divided by GDP at factor costs (𝑌 𝑌𝑓⁄ ). Thus, the total effect of a change in 𝑤𝑠 on exports 
includes the effect of 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 on 𝑢𝑙𝑐, the effect of 𝑢𝑙𝑐 on export prices, and the effect of 𝑃𝑥 on 
exports. The average values of 
𝑋/𝑌
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
 for the sample mean are used to convert the elasticity to 
marginal effects. Finally, we take the negation of the total effect6. A similar procedure is 
followed for imports: 
∆(𝑀/𝑌)
∆(𝜋)
= (−) (
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
𝜕 log(𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕 log(𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕 log(𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕 log(𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐)
𝜕 log(𝑤𝑠)
)
𝑀 𝑌⁄
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
= (−) (𝑒𝑀𝑃 𝑒𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐶  
1
1−𝑒𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐶
𝑌𝑓
𝑌
)
𝑀/𝑌
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
   
(10) 
 
The sum of partial effects of a change in π on consumption, investment, and net exports 
(𝑁𝑋 = 𝑋 − 𝑀) is the effect on private excess demand. This, in turn, will further affect 
consumption, investment, and imports through the multiplier mechanism.   
 
3.1 Effects of a simultaneous change in the profit share  
Until now, the unit of analysis has been the nation state. However, ignoring the effects due to 
a simultaneous change in distribution in Europe overestimates the positive effects of a fall in 
the 𝑤𝑠 on net exports. While higher openness of an economy increases the relevance of the 
positive effects of a fall in the 𝑤𝑠 due to a higher share of net exports in GDP, it is important 
to recognise that European economies are integrated and there has been a contagion effect of 
                                                          
6 The marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 on exports and imports is the negation of the effect of a 1%-
point increase in 𝑤𝑠.  
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wage moderation policies as countries are trying to compete on the basis of wage costs. This 
decreases the effects of a fall in the 𝑤𝑠 on net exports when it is implemented simultaneously 
in a variety of countries, as relative prices of exports and imports do not change significantly 
when all countries reduce their 𝑢𝑙𝑐. As a result, analysing the full effects of the fall in the 𝑤𝑠 
requires an integrated analysis that incorporates cross-country interactions7.  
In the following, we present the European-wide effects of a simultaneous change in π in all 
economies based on the multi-country model developed in Onaran and Galanis (2014). This 
European multiplier mechanism incorporates the effects of a change in 𝜋 on the aggregate 
demand of each economy through the changes in import prices and the GDP of trade partners. 
For the case of 𝑛 countries, the percentage change in GDP of each country is 
                 
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
= 𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + 𝐻𝑛𝑥𝑛
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
+ 𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + 𝑊𝑛𝑥𝑛
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
                        (11) 
 
The matrices 𝐸 and 𝐻 represent the effects of a change in each country’s own π on demand in 
that particular country. Matrices 𝑃 and 𝑊 add the effects of changes in import prices and GDP 
of trade partners on net exports of each country. 
𝐸 is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are the effect of a change in 𝜋 in country j on 
private excess demand (𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝑁𝑋/𝑌) in country j. Matrix 𝐻 reflects the national multiplier 
effects and hence shows the effect of an autonomous change in private excess demand on 
aggregate demand. Matrix 𝑃 illustrates the effect of a change in trade partners` 𝜋 on import 
prices and hence on net exports in each country. Finally, matrix 𝑊 shows effects of a change 
                                                          
7 Rezai (2011) and von Arnim et al. (2012) present theoretical models similar to the analysis in this paper.  
  
12 
 
in trade partners’ GPD on exports of each country. Solving equation (11) for [
∆𝑌
𝑌
] gives us the 
equivalent of a European multiplier effect: 
                                 
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
= (𝐼𝑛𝑥𝑛 − 𝐻𝑛𝑥𝑛 − 𝑊𝑛𝑥𝑛)
−1(𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛) [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
]                       (12) 
The details on each matrix are shown in appendix D.  
 
Given the high economic integration of the European economy a full understanding of the 
simultaneous fall in the wage share requires an integrated European wide analysis. In 2013, the 
greater proportion of a member states total trade in goods was with partners within the EU-28 
with an average of 62% share of total exports (Eurostat, 2015). 
 
3.2 Total effects on investment, net exports, and inflation 
Next we model the effects on investment to determine the character of the accumulation regime 
as defined in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). A strong partial effect of 𝜋 and a weak partial effect 
of 𝑌 on I favour a positive impact of pro-capital redistribution on investment, resulting in a 
profit-led investment regime (
∆𝐼 𝑌⁄
∆𝜋
> 0). In the reverse constellation a pro-capital 
redistribution would have a negative effect on investment leading to a wage-led investment 
regime (
∆𝐼 𝑌⁄
∆𝜋
< 0). Therefore, the total effects will depend on whether the profitability or the 
accelerator effects dominate as well as the sign and size of the overall effect of 𝜋 on Y. We 
calculate the total effects on investment as follows:  
                                                     
∆𝐼 𝑌⁄
∆𝜋
= [(
∆𝑌 𝑌⁄
∆𝜋
𝑒𝐼𝑌
𝐼
𝑌
) + 𝑖𝜋
𝐼
𝑅
]                                                  
(13) 
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where 
∆𝑌 𝑌⁄
∆𝜋
 illustrates the change in aggregate demand in the economy and 𝑒𝐼𝑌 reflects the 
elasticity of investment to GDP. In order to convert elasticities into marginal effects we 
multiply with the sample mean of  
𝐼
𝑌
. The first term is the ex-post multiplier indirect effect, 
whereas the second term is the direct partial profitability effect as calculated in equation (3). 
Regarding the trade balance, the total effect of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 on net exports 
in wage-led countries will be positive and larger after the multiplier due to a fall in imports 
following lower growth; however the effect in profit-led countries is theoretically ambiguous. 
There will be a positive effect on imports due to the rise in GDP in profit-led countries, which 
partially offsets the positive price competition effects and deteriorates the trade balance 
position. Furthermore, when there is a simultaneous change in all countries, and if the EU15 
as a whole is wage-led, this leads to a decrease in trade partners’ GDP, and a negative effect 
on exports. This may offset the positive effects via prices; hence the total effect on trade balance 
is ambiguous in both the wage-led and profit-led economies.  We calculate the post-multiplier 
net export effects as: 
 
                        
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑁𝑋/𝑌1
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝑁𝑋/𝑌𝑛
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
= (𝑁𝑋𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛) [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + (𝑊𝑛𝑥𝑛 − 𝑀𝑛𝑥𝑛)
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌/𝑌1
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝑌/𝑌𝑛
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
                     (14) 
 
where 
                                          𝑁𝑋𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑁𝑋
𝑌1
∆𝜋1
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ ⋯
∆𝑁𝑋
𝑌𝑛
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       (15) 
and  
                                           𝑀𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
∆𝑀1
∆𝑌1
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ ⋯ ⋮
⋮ … ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ ⋯
∆𝑀𝑛
∆𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
 
                                     (16) 
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where 𝑁𝑋𝑖𝑖 is 
∆𝑋
𝑌1
∆𝜋1
−
∆𝑀
𝑌1
∆𝜋1
  calculated as in Equations (9) and (10) and 𝑀𝑖𝑖   is calculated as 𝑒𝑀𝑌𝑖
𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑖
. 
𝑁𝑋 represents a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix which includes the effects of a change in 𝜋  in country i on net exports in 
country i. 𝑀 is a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix which includes the effects of a change in 𝜋 in country i on imports in 
country i.   
Next, we analyse the price effects of changes in income distribution. We calculate the 
percentage change in the domestic price level, i.e. inflation (∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃) as a response to an isolated change 
in 𝜋 in one country as: 
          
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋
 = − [
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑠
]
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
= −(𝑒𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐶  
1
1−𝑒𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐶
𝑌𝑓
𝑌
)
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
               (17) 
 
where ePULC illustrates the effect of 𝑢𝑙𝑐 on 𝑃. We multiply with 
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
 to convert elasticities to marginal 
effects. We take the negation of the total effect in order to simulate an increase in 𝜋. 
Next, we calculate the effects of a simultaneous change in 𝜋 on prices in each country as: 
                                                
              
⌊
 
 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋1
⋮
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
= (𝐷𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + 𝑃𝑀𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
0 ∆𝜋2 ⋯ ∆𝜋𝑛
∆𝜋1 ⋱ ⋯ ⋮
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∆𝜋1 ∆𝜋2 ⋯ 0
] [
𝑝𝑚1
⋮
𝑝𝑚𝑛
])                (18) 
where 
 
 
 
 
                               𝐷𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛 =
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𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋1
0 ⋯ 0
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⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ ⋯
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
 
                                                       (19) 
and 
                    
                 𝑃𝑀𝑛𝑥𝑛 =
⌊
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⋯
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where 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑖 is 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃
∆𝜋
 as calculated in equation (17) and 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗is calculated as: 
 
                                         𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 =
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑥)𝑗
∆𝜋𝑗
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑖
= −(𝑒𝑃𝑥𝑗
1
1−𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑗
𝑌𝑗
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑗
)
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑖
                  (21) 
 
𝐷𝑃 represents a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix which includes the effects of a change in 𝜋 in country i on domestic prices 
in country i.  𝑃𝑀 is a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix which includes the effects of a change in 𝜋 in country j on inflation 
in country i via changes in the import prices of country i. 
As wage negotiations are conducted in nominal terms we are also interested in the relationship 
between nominal wages and the  𝑤𝑠. However, this includes also changes in productivity growth. We 
derive the required % change in the nominal wage rate as follows: 
                                             
     ∆log (𝑢𝑙𝑐) = 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 − 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑧                                             (22) 
 
where 𝛥log (𝑢𝑙𝑐) illustrates a log change in nominal unit labour costs and is the difference between a 
log change in the nominal wage rate, 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 and a log change in total labour productivity, 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑧.  
Hence, to calculate the required % change in the 𝑤 we rearrange: 
                                                    𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤 =  𝛥log (𝑢𝑙𝑐) + 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑧                                         (23) 
 
4. Estimation methodology 
 
We apply a single-equation approach in order to analyse the effects of the changes in the 𝑤𝑠 on growth 
for EU15 countries. We estimate the distributional effects on individual components of private 
aggregate demand, which are consumption, investment, exports and imports for each country as is 
widely applied in the literature (Stockhammer et al., 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Hein and Vogel, 
2008). Unit root tests suggest that most of our variables are integrated of order one. Therefore, we will 
take first differences of the variables to avoid possible spurious regressions. The profit share is 
stationary in Greece, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK and hence we use this variable in its level 
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in these countries. Error-correction models (ECM) are applied wherever statistically significant8. In all 
estimations we start with general specifications with both the contemporaneous values and first lags of 
the variables as well as a lagged dependent variable, and keep those variables, which are statistically 
significant. Wherever there is autocorrelation, either the lagged dependent variable is kept or an AR(1) 
term is added.  
The single equation approach has several advantages. It allows for flexible modelling of the 
individual behavioural functions for single countries and to detect the precise economic relationships 
between demand and changes in income distribution (Onaran and Galanis, 2014). Moreover, it is 
possible to distinguish between domestic and total effects that include international trade. However, it 
fails to account for the fact that 𝐶, 𝐼 and 𝑁𝑋 add up to private demand. The main alternative, a vector 
autoregression model, estimates the goods market equilibrium in a full model and has been applied by 
Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) or Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), among others. The advantage of 
this approach is that the interaction between the variables can be incorporated and it allows for tracing 
effects through an entire system rather than analysing one equation at a time. Also, it is more suitable 
to deal with simultaneity bias. However, using this approach would require a substantial simplification 
of the model since it cannot handle more than five endogenous variables (Onaran and Galanis, 2014). 
In the context of our analysis, this would lead to a misspecification of the behavioural functions and 
does not give a precise account of the effects of the 𝑤𝑠 on 𝐶, 𝐼 and 𝑁𝑋.  
The second major qualification relates to changes in the functional income distribution. In order 
to focus on the determinants of demand we take the 𝑤𝑠 as exogenous assuming that the time lag of 
potential feedback effects takes longer than one year. However, it is important to recognize that income 
distribution is endogenous (i.e. a higher unemployment rate lowers the wage share) in reality. 
Endogenising income distribution is not feasible in the absence of appropriate instrumental variables 
and using earlier lags is also not possible due to the short time series data.  
 
                                                          
8 The t-ratios reported by Banerjee et al. (1998) are used for the speed of adjustment coefficient to test whether 
there is cointegration among the variables.  
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5. Estimation Results 
  
The regression results for consumption are in Table 1. The hypothesis that the marginal propensity to 
consume between profit income and wage income differs is confirmed in all countries. The estimation 
results for investment are given in Table 2. In all countries, GDP has strong and significant accelerator 
effects on private investment. The effects of 𝜋 are less robust across countries; it has no statistically 
significant effect in Austria, Finland, Germany9, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK. In these 
cases the effects are treated as zero when we calculate the total effects on private excess demand. 
 
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
 
Comparing these results to previous findings in the empirical literature (Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Hein 
and Vogel, 2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009) we find a general breakdown of the profit-investment 
nexus since the start of the Great Recession in 2007. Onaran et al. (2011) find that in the case of the US 
when interest and dividend payments are deducted from the profit share, there is a positive effect on 
investment illustrating the impact of financialisation on the sensitivity of investment to  𝜋. Such a 
correction, however, is beyond the scope of this paper due to limited time series data on dividend 
payments in most EU15 countries.  
The estimation results for domestic prices, export prices as well as exports and imports are given in 
Tables 3 to 6 respectively. The results are in line with our expectations, except in Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal there are no significant effects of export prices relative to 
import prices on exports. Similarly, we find no statistically significant effects of domestic prices relative 
to import prices on imports in the case of Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg. Table 
E1 in appendix E summarises the effects of a change in 𝜋 on 𝑋/𝑌 and 𝑀 𝑌 ⁄ as described in Equations 
                                                          
9 While Onaran and Galanis (2014) found 𝜋 to be significant in the investment equation in Germany we found it 
to be insignificant with revised data for both samples 1960-2007 and 1960-2013. Our findings are in accordance 
with Stockhammer et al. (2011) and Hein and Vogel (2008). 
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9 and 10. The total effect does depend not only on the elasticity of exports and imports to relative prices 
and the pass through from labour costs to prices, but also on the share of the respective component in 
GDP. As a result, in small open economies the effects are likely to be much larger compared to large 
relatively closed economies. 
 
[Table 3] 
[Table 4] 
[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
 
 5.1 National effects 
Table 7 summarizes the effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 on components of private aggregate demand: 
consumption, investment, exports and imports.  
The first column reports the partial effects on consumption. The marginal propensity to 
consume out of wages is higher than out of profits, thus a rise in 𝜋  negatively affects consumption. The 
differences between marginal propensities to consume range mostly between -0.23 (Ireland) and -0.564 
(Greece). However, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg have relatively low (-0.15) albeit statistically 
significant negative consumption differentials10.   
The second column gives the partial effects on private investment. A 1%-point increase in 𝜋 in 
the EU15 countries leads to an increase in investment with values ranging between 0.07%-points 
(Netherlands) to 0.20%-points (Belgium) as a ratio to GDP. If we sum up the effects of an increase in 
𝜋 on domestic private demand the negative effect on consumption is substantially larger than the 
positive effect on investment in absolute values in 13 out of 15 countries11. Thus, domestic demand in 
the EU15 is clearly wage-led.  
                                                          
10The results are robust when we use unadjusted wages or wage share as the regressors. Our mean differential is 
minus 0.312 and hence in alignment with previous studies, i.e. Marglin and Bhaduri (1992) find a savings 
differential of 0.37 for a sample of sixteen OECD countries. 
11 Belgium and Denmark are two exceptions in our sample. 
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The integration of the foreign sector, however, has a crucial role in determining whether an 
economy is wage-led or profit-led (Blecker, 1989). The effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 on net 
exports range between 0.05%-points (Germany) to 0.40%-points (Austria) as a ratio to GDP.  
Column F sums up the partial effects on private excess demand when 𝜋 increases in each 
country in isolation. Overall, large economies such as the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain as well as 
some small economies such as Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Luxemburg are wage-
led.. Two small economies, Austria and Ireland are profit-led when integrating the foreign sector, as 
well as Belgium and Denmark, which already had profit-led domestic demand due to low consumption 
differentials and high investment effects.  
Column G reports the multiplier, which was calculated using the elasticities of 𝐶, 𝐼, and 𝑀 with 
regard to 𝑌. The details of this calculation are presented in appendix F table F1. The multipliers are 
mostly above one and range between 1.03 in Austria and 2.1 in Spain, with only three small open 
countries having a multiplier less than one (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands)12.  
 
When multiplier effects are taken into account, the effect of a change in distribution on demand becomes 
amplified (for countries with multipliers larger than one). Column H in Table 7 reports the %-change 
in equilibrium aggregate demand after the multiplier mechanism.  
 
[Table 7] 
 
5.2 Europe-wide effects 
Next, we analyse the effects of a simultaneous 1%-point increase in π taking place in all EU15 countries. 
Column I in Table 7 presents the results. Most strikingly, two economies, which were profit-led in 
isolation – Austria and Ireland, – also start to contract after the incorporation of further effects on their 
net exports due to decreasing wage shares of their trade partners, which reduce export prices and GDP 
of the trade partners, which are wage-led. Thus, when everyone is pursuing the same wage competition 
                                                          
12 The IMF (2009) reports capital spending multipliers between 0.5 and 1.8.  
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strategy in Europe the expansionary effects of an increase in π are reversed as relative price effects are 
moderated and external demand dampens.  
Comparing columns H and I in table 7, wage-led economies experience even stronger negative 
effects on demand. Demand in the large economies (rather closed) such as Germany, France, Spain, 
Italy and the UK now decrease by 0.23% to 0.54%. Demand in small open economies such as Ireland, 
Greece, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Portugal decrease by 0.07% and 1.03%. Greece, albeit a small 
open economy, stands out as a strongly wage-led economy due to very low sensitivity of exports to 
labour costs, no significant effect of labour costs on imports and no significant effects of profitability 
on private investment. Even in isolation, a rise in the profit share leads to a 0.92% fall in demand, and 
the effect increases further after a race to the bottom in the wage share in Europe. Indeed, only Belgium 
and Denmark do not contract as an outcome of a simultaneous increase in 𝜋; however, the effects on 
growth diminish significantly in these countries as well and become almost economically insignificant, 
close to zero in the case of Belgium.  
 
Overall, a simultaneous decline in the 𝑤𝑠 in all countries leads to a decline in the EU15 GDP by 0.30%.  
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to account for the exceptional behaviour of the economies during the crisis years we have 
checked the robustness of our results using a reduced sample size between 1960 and 200713. However, 
the results are overall robust when estimations are repeated excluding the Great Recession years. As a 
second robustness check, we used unadjusted wages. We again found that the results are robust.  
Furthermore, since the European effects are estimated on the basis of separate equations for 
each country, we also tested a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) to check for the robustness 
of our results. Indeed, we found the cross-correlation among the error terms of all six equations (C, I, 
P, Px, X, M) for the EU15 countries to be statistically significant. In other words, there is a common 
factor that simultaneously affects all EU15 countries. This is plausible since the EU15 represent a highly 
                                                          
13 Results are available upon request. 
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integrated economy, i.e. are affected by a common monetary policy. However, SUR methodology 
comes at a cost. First, our SUR estimations show that we do not increase statistical significance by 
applying a systems approach14. In contrast, in the investment specifications effects of 𝜋 on investment 
becomes insignificant in the case of France, Spain, and Sweden, as opposed to the significant effects in 
the single equation estimations. Moreover, there are strong ‘contagion effects’ within the systems 
approach; thus a missspecified equation in one country leads to a change in otherwise significant results 
in other country specifications. Most importantly, our overall findings remain robust when estimating 
a SUR model, e.g. the EU15 GDP declines by 0.34%-points according to the SUR results, which is very 
close to the result based on single country simulations and still indicates that Europe as a whole is wage-
led.  
 
6. Comparison with the literature 
 
Our results are in alignment with those of Onaran and Galanis (2014), Storm and Naastepad (2012), 
Stockhammer et al. (2011), Stockhammer and Ederer (2008) for Austria, Finland, Germany, France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK15. 
Storm and Naastepad (2012) find Denmark to be wage-led in domestic demand as well as total 
demand and Belgium to be undefined. However, their estimations do not pay attention to unit root 
issues. Furthermore, international trade is modelled by means of estimating the effects of real unit labour 
costs directly on exports, and they do not estimate the effects on imports.  
Bowles and Boyer (1995) find profit-led regimes in total demand in Germany and France. 
However, while their paper is seminal in terms of testing strategy, they do not discuss the time series 
properties of their variables and hence do not apply difference or error correction models.  
                                                          
14 Results are available upon request. 
15 In alignment with our estimation strategy we focus on the empirical literature employing a single equation 
approach. Other studies (i.e. Onaran and Stockhammer, 2005) have applied a vector autoregressive approach. 
Stockhammer et al. (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014) provide more extensive reviews of the empirical 
literature.  
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Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011), focusing on domestic demand only, find mixed results for 
Ireland, depending on the amount of lags included. However, they find perverse but statistically 
insignificant consumption effects. In alignment with our findings, the authors find domestic demand in 
Luxembourg to be wage-led.   
Hein and Vogel (2008) differ from our results regarding the Netherlands only, which they find 
to be profit-led. However, the unconventional finding that domestic demand is profit-led drives these 
results.  
Overall, our results confirm the findings of the majority of studies that domestic demand tends to be 
wage-led; aggregate demand in large economies also tend to be wage-led, whereas small open 
economies may be profit-led due to international trade effects.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the aggregate demand regime in 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg.  
 
7. Wage-led recovery scenarios 
 
In this section, we set out the effects on growth of an alternative scenario of a simultaneous wage-led 
recovery in the EU15 countries over the next 5 years. Obviously, if all countries increase their wage 
share by 1%-point EU15 GDP would go up by 0.30%. In this scenario, however, the small open 
economies Belgium and Denmark would contract. In table 8, we illustrate three alternative scenarios 
that take into account country specific room for manoeuvre to increase the wage share.  
In the first scenario in Table 8, all EU15 countries increase their wage shares back to the latest 
peak level, which would trigger an increase in EU15 GDP of 2.56%. However, Denmark would again 
contract.  
In the second scenario, all EU15 countries follow a differentiated increase in the 𝑤𝑠 with a 5%-
point increase in the wage-led countries, a 3%-point increase in the intermediate group of Ireland and 
Austria which become wage-led in the race to the bottom scenario, and a 1%-point increase in Belgium 
and Denmark, which remain profit-led countries also in the race to the bottom scenario. In this scenario, 
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all EU15 countries can grow along with an improvement in the 𝑤𝑠 leading to an increase in EU15 GDP 
of 1.51%.  
Finally, we can simulate a mix of the first and second scenario by outlining a wage share 
recovery back to the peak level in wage-led countries and a homogenous 3%-point increase in profit-
led countries. In this scenario, all countries can grow along with an increase in the 𝑤𝑠 and EU15 GDP 
increases by 3.15%.  
[Table 8] 
 
7.1 Effects on Investment and Trade Balance  
In this section, we focus on the effects on investment and net exports. Appendix G Table G1 shows the 
total effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 on investment and net exports in the EU15 countries in isolation.  
The effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋 are on investment are diverse. In isolation, investment 
regime is wage-led, i.e. the effect of a rise in 𝜋 on I/Y is negative in Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the UK whereas the investment regime is profit led in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden. The effects are ranging from 
strong negative effects in wage-led countries such as Greece (-0.43) to moderate positive effects in 
profit-led countries (0.27) in Denmark.  
The effects on the trade balance are almost always positive. Belgium is an exception with a 
negative effect of -0.01 due to very low positive net export effects via the price channel and a strong 
increase in imports following the increase in aggregate demand.  In other countries, the effects on net 
exports/GDP are ranging between 0.07 (Ireland) and 0.32 (Austria). The total effects on net exports are 
larger than the partial effects via price channels in wage-led economies, and lower in profit-led countries 
(compared to the partial effects reported in Column E in Table 7). 
Next, we report the total effects on investment and net exports following a simultaneous 1%-
point increase in 𝜋 in the EU15 countries in Appendix G table G2. In this case Austria also experiences 
a decline in investment following a simultaneous 1%-point increase in 𝜋 and hence 8 countries have a 
wage-led investment regime. The negative effects of a simultaneous rise in 𝜋 on investment is larger 
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(in absolute value) in countries with wage-led investment regimes, and countries with profit-led 
investment regimes now experience smaller increases in investment due to more moderate growth 
effects (comparing columns one in Tables G1 and G2). 
Regarding the net exports effects, in all countries, the total effects of a simultaneous rise in 𝜋  is lower 
(reported in the second column of Table G2) compared to the effects of an isolated change in 𝜋  
(reported in the second column of Table G1) due to the fall in external demand. On average, however, 
net exports would still increase by 0.16%-points in the EU15 as a whole. Net exports decline only in 
Belgium.    
Finally, Table 9 column C and D show the effects of a (simultaneous) differentiated increase in 
the 𝑤𝑠 based on scenario 2 in Table 8 (column A and B in Table 9), on investment and trade balance in 
the EU15 countries.   
In 9 European countries the positive accelerator effects overpower the negative profitability 
effects leading to a wage-led investment regime. Greece experiences the strongest positive effects on 
𝐼 𝑌⁄ of roughly 2.4%-points.  We find a profit-led investment regime in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands and Sweden with negative effects ranging between -0.05%-points and -0.41%-points. 
While further investment policies are undoubtedly required, particularly in countries with profit-led 
investment regimes, overall, due to increasing GDP and hence strong accelerator effects a wage-led 
recovery could generate an increase of 0.24%-points in 𝐼/𝑌 in the EU15.  
The effects of a differentiated increase in the 𝑤𝑠 on net exports are negative in the majority of 
the EU15 except Belgium and Denmark as can be seen in Table 9 column D. While net exports/GDP 
decrease by only 0.05%-points in Ireland, it decreases by 1.40%-points in Greece.  
[Table 9] 
 
7.2 Effects on Prices and Nominal Unit Labour Costs 
In this section, we analyse to what extent a wage stimulus in the EU15 countries would exert inflationary 
pressures.  
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Appendix G table G3 summarises the effects of a 1%-point increase in the wage share in isolation and 
simultaneously as well as a differentiated simultaneous increase in the 𝑤𝑠 on annual inflation. On 
average, annual inflation would rise by 1.4%-point as an outcome of a simultaneous 1%-point increase 
in the wage share in the EU15 countries, and 1.2%-point following a differentiated increase in the  𝑤𝑠 
as suggested in Scenario 2 in Table 8. It is plausible that the effects on inflation are not as strong as the 
effects on nominal 𝑢𝑙𝑐 since firms might not be able translate higher costs into higher prices, particularly 
in relatively open economies16. As an outcome of our wage-led recovery Scenario 2, the majority of 
countries would experience increasing inflation rates well below the ECB target inflation rate, which is 
below (but close to) 2%. In Spain and the UK the increase in annual inflation marginally exceeds this 
limit, and in Italy it would lead to an increase in inflation rate of 2.7%-points. In light of a risk of 
deflation in the Eurozone our findings indicate that a wage stimulus in the EU15 would indeed help 
keeping the European economy away from deflation. 
Since collective wage bargaining negotiations are conducted in nominal terms, we also 
calculate the required annual increase in the nominal wage rate to increase the 𝑤𝑠 by 1%-point. On 
average, a 1% point increase in the 𝑤𝑠 would increase 𝑢𝑙𝑐 by 2.8% in the EU15 countries (appendix G 
table G3). Labour factor productivity in the EU15 countries increased by roughly 0.7% in the decade 
between 1997 and 2007 on average excluding the crisis years. Scenario 2 would be consistent with an 
annual nominal wage increase of 3.1% in the EU15 on average (e.g. 1.9% in Ireland, 3.6% in Greece).  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper has highlighted that a simultaneous decline in the wage share in a 
highly integrated European economy leads to a decline in growth, although the magnitude of the effect 
is not large. Hence there is room to stimulate demand in the current economic climate of deficient 
                                                          
16 Stockhammer et al. (2011) find that a change in 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 by 1% will come with an increase of 0.72% in inflation 
in the case of Germany. They analyse different sub-sample periods and their results indicate that an increased 
openness of the German economy limits the ability of firms to pass on an increase in 𝑢𝑙𝑐. 
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demand and sluggish growth: A 1%-point increase in the wage share at the European level could lead 
to a 0.30% increase in EU15 GDP. 
In alignment with previous research, the negative effects of a fall in the wage share on 
consumption overpower the positive effects on investment in 13 European countries. Domestic demand 
is hence clearly wage-led in the EU15. Small open economies may have a profit-led regime when the 
foreign sector is included due to a higher degree of openness of the economy, whereas the net export 
effects tend not to dominate in relatively closed large economies. In isolation, we have found 11 
countries to be wage-led and 4 countries to be profit-led. 
This paper went beyond the nation state and estimated the impact of a simultaneous decline in 
the wage share on demand and hence growth in EU15 countries. In a scenario of a simultaneous fall in 
the wage share, the positive net export effects are essentially wiped out leaving profit-led demand 
regimes in only Belgium and Denmark. Thus, when all EU15 countries pursue beggar thy neighbour 
policies, the competitiveness effects will be minor while the domestic effects dominate. A cautious 
interpretation of the empirical results suggests that a more equal income distribution does not hamper 
growth in Europe. 
The results also illustrate a fallacy of composition issue between the micro rationale and macro 
outcomes of a pro-capital redistribution. While a higher profit share seems to be beneficial to the 
individual firm, in a wage-led economy it creates a problem of realisation of profits due to deficient 
demand. By the same token, even if increasing profit shares seem to promote growth at the national 
level in some profit-led economies, at the European level a simultaneous fall in the wage share leads to 
European demand deficiency as well as contraction, even in originally profit-led economies such as 
Austria and Ireland. 
The estimated model in this paper has been kept simple to analyse the role of income 
distribution in determining private demand. Possible extensions include a richer modelling of the 
government sector, i.e. the potential crowding in effects on private investment.  
The applied estimation approach might introduce some bias resulting from endogeneity issues and 
single-equation-based estimations. However, our results are robust across different sample sizes, and 
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estimation methods (i.e. the use of SUR) and in alignment with the findings of the majority of previous 
studies. Moreover, our results are consistent with the intuition that the EU15 countries have low extra 
regional trade and hence represent a rather closed economy.   
Policies of internal devaluation have been negative for demand and growth in the EU15 
countries. In an alternative scenario of a wage-led recovery, we have shown that it is possible for all 
countries to grow along a simultaneous differentiated increase in the wage share. If large wage-led 
economies take the initiative, egalitarian growth becomes feasible including in small open economies.   
Furthermore, as a result of a wage-led recovery policy, annual inflation in the EU15 countries 
would remain well below the ECB target inflation rate. Therefore, a coordinated wage stimulus can 
keep the European economy away from deflation.  
An increase in the wage share, interestingly, does not negatively impact the investment 
performance in the EU15 as a whole with most countries experiencing an increase in investment. The 
impact of wage increases on trade imbalances across countries require further targeted industrial policy 
at the European level. Achieving convergence in the level of nominal unit labour costs and overcoming 
persistent imbalances requires a more comprehensive policy mix of wage policies, investment and 
industrial policies.   
Our results have important policy implications. First, if a country is wage-led, increasing the 
wage share is not an impediment to growth. Second, wage policy coordination in a highly integrated 
Europe, which tends to be wage-led, can improve growth and employment. Third, a coordinated wage 
stimulus does not have negative effects on investment in aggregate and induced inflation does not 
conflict with the ECB inflation target. Finally, a wage-led recovery scenario as an alternative to the 
current strategy of wage moderation implemented in the European countries is feasible, given that the 
coordination problem can be overcome.  
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Wage share (adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost). 
Source: AMECO Online (2014). 
Notes: Greece exhibit high levels of wage share due to the share of substantial agricultural self-employment in GDP. In Portugal, total 
compensation of employees increased substantially following the military coup in 1974. 
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Table 1. Consumption: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶) 
 c 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑹𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑾𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏) (𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
0.005 
(1.567) 
0.160 
(4.394)*** 
0.616 
(6.024)*** 
  
2.369 
 
0.527 
 
1961- 
2013 
B 
 
0.007 
(2.963)*** 
0.148 
(3.832)*** 
0.483 
(7.506)*** 
  
2.241 
 
0.590 
 
1961- 
2013 
DK 
 
0.001 
(0.323) 
0.236 
(4.758)*** 
0.655 
(6.262)*** 
  
1.869 
 
0.564 
 
1961- 
2013 
FIN 
 
0.007 
(2.735)*** 
0.184 
(7.984)*** 
0.635 
(11.061)*** 
  
1.694 
 
0.774 
 
1961- 
2013 
F 
 
0.006 
(2.751)*** 
0.143 
(4.865)*** 
0.657 
(10.635)*** 
  
2.074 
 
0.771 
 
1961- 
2013 
D 
 
0.004 
1.313 
0.101 
(2.151)** 
0.476 
(4.352)*** 
0.292 
(2.500)** 
 
2.090 
 
0.707 
 
1962- 
2013 
GR 
 
0.013 
(3.889)*** 
0.114 
(3.859)*** 
0.633 
(10.282)*** 
  
1.771 
 
0.748 
 
1962- 
2013 
IRL 
 
0.004 
(0.798) 
0.183 
(4.746)*** 
0.520 
(5.153)*** 
  
2.233 
 
0.483 
 
1961- 
2013 
I 
 
0.004 
(1.793)* 
0.204 
(4.713)*** 
0.744 
(9.447)*** 
  
1.531 
 
0.773 
 
1961- 
2013 
L 
 
0.016 
(4.087)*** 
0.103 
(3.451)*** 
0.350 
(4.920)*** 
  
1.741 
 
0.350 
 
1961- 
2013 
NL 
 
-0.004 
(-1.574) 
0.149 
(4.807)*** 
0.582 
(5.749)*** 
0.376 
(3.766)*** 
 
1.876 
 
0.813 
 
1962- 
2013 
P 
 
0.012 
(3.025)*** 
0.099 
(6.177)*** 
0.612 
(8.195)*** 
  
2.121 
 
0.615 
 
1961- 
2013 
E 
 
0.001 
(0.278) 
0.182 
(4.750)*** 
0.767 
(16.751)*** 
  
2.096 
 
0.878 
 
1961- 
2013 
S 
 
0.006 
(2.279)** 
0.088 
(2.788)*** 
0.554 
(7.891)*** 
  
1.736 
 
0.578 
 
1961- 
2013 
UK 
 
0.005 
(1.627) 
0.209 
(6.744)*** 
0.702 
(7.567)*** 
 
0.273 
(1.884)* 
1.944 
 
0.718 
 
1962- 
2013 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Table 2. Private investment: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼) 
 c 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑰𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒓𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒓𝒕) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑰𝒕−𝟏) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕−𝟏) (𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
-0.025 
(-2.828)*** 
0.110 
(0.830) 
 
1.881 
(7.359)***  
      2.018 0.526 
1962-
2013 
B 
 
-0.632 
(-4.595)*** 
 
0.239 
(2.290)** 
2.387 
(6.527)*** 
0.234 
(2.340)** 
  
-0.247 
(-4.107)** 
0.330 
(4.789)*** 
 
1.932 
 
0.638 
 
1963-
2013 
DK 
 
-0.038 
(-4.448)*** 
0.321 
(1.948)* 
 
2.929 
(11.168)*** 
 
-0.008 
(-2.310)** 
 
 
   
1.883 
 
0.751 
 
1963-
2013 
FIN 
 
-0.038 
(-3.451)*** 
0.174 
(1.588) 
 
2.067 
(9.138)*** 
     
0.322 
(2.186)** 
1.841 
 
0.752 
 
1963-
2013 
F 
 
-0.032 
(-4.221)*** 
0.155 
(1.646)* 
 
2.214 
(12.179)*** 
  
-0.002 
(-1.300) 
  
0.541 
(4.616)*** 
1.940 
 
0.826 
 
1963-
2013 
D 
 
-0.021 
(-2.196)** 
0.121 
(0.544) 
 
1.810 
(7.149)*** 
     
0.360 
(2.154)** 
1.613 
 
0.590 
 
1963-
2013 
GR 
0.028 
(0.513) 
 
0.091 
(1.518) 
2.293 
(9.862)*** 
     
-0.265 
(-1.907)* 
2.017 
 
0.625 
 
1962-
2013 
IRL 
-0.036 
(-1.976)* 
0.338 
(1.967)* 
 
1.802 
(5.004)*** 
      
1.988 
 
0.416 
 
1963-
2013 
I 
 
-0.026 
(-2.941)*** 
0.295 
(1.761)* 
 
1.722 
(7.841)*** 
 
-0.003 
(-1.172) 
   
0.331 
(2.293)** 
1.943 
 
0.636 
 
1964-
2013 
L 
 
-0.029 
(-1.420) 
0.160 
(0.675) 
 
1.728 
(4.172)*** 
      
2.410 
 
0.273 
 
1963-
2013 
NL 
 
-0.392 
(-2.762)*** 
 
0.130 
(3.030)*** 
2.681 
(9.527)*** 
   
-0.299  
(-5.346)*** 
0.295 
(5.237)*** 
 
2.299 
 
0.714 
 
1961-
2013 
P 
 
-0.042 
(-2.834)*** 
0.024 
(0.440) 
 
2.119 
(6.662)*** 
      
2.026 
 
0.485 
 
1962-
2013 
E 
 
0.099 
(1.098) 
 
0.134 
(1.664)* 
2.720 
(9.443)*** 
     
0.415 
(3.297)*** 
1.994 
 
0.769 
 
1962-
2013 
S 
 
0.119 
(1.759)* 
 
0.159 
(2.384)** 
2.406 
(9.892)*** 
0.269 
(3.437)*** 
     
1.794 
 
0.729 
 
1962-
2013 
UK 
 
-0.474 
(-1.815)* 
 
0.134 
(1.581) 
2.283 
(8.870)*** 
   
-0.243 
(-3.527)** 
0.261 
(3.220)*** 
 
1.909 
 
0.677 
 
1961-
2013 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Table 3. Price deflator: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃) 
 c 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕 − 𝟏)`     (𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
0.005 
(2.433)** 
 
0.286 
(4.952)*** 
0.453 
(5.320)*** 
0.146 
(3.715)*** 
  1.920 0.851 
1962- 
2012 
B 
 
0.020 
(3.797)*** 
0.180 
(2.226)** 
  
0.154 
(5.036)*** 
0.129 
(4.333)*** 
0.627 
(4.829)*** 
2.163 
 
0.811 
 
1962- 
2012 
DK 
 
0.008 
(2.423)** 
0.249 
(2.698)*** 
 
0.465 
(4.037)*** 
 
0.183 
(5.266)*** 
 2.029 0.865 
1962- 
2012 
FIN 
 
0.009 
(2.511)** 
 
0.388 
(5.328)*** 
0.249 
(2.834)*** 
0.220 
(5.520)*** 
  1.890 0.842 
1962- 
2012 
F 
 
0.004 
(1.718)* 
0.194 
(1.624) 
 
0.633 
(4.635)*** 
 
0.094 
(3.580)*** 
 1.795 0.907 
1962- 
2012 
D 
 
0.017 
(4.333)*** 
 
0.382 
(7.351)*** 
   
(0.699) 
6.577*** 
2.091 0.834 
1962- 
2012 
GR 
 
0.019 
(2.870)*** 
0.423 
(5.932)*** 
  
0.462 
(6.435)*** 
  1.758 0.810 
1962- 
2012 
IRL 
 
0.031 
(2.987)*** 
0.256 
(1.863)* 
  
0.284 
(3.744)*** 
 
(0.431) 
2.490** 
2.111 0.678 
1962- 
2012 
I 
 
0.014 
(3.033)*** 
0.633 
(10.044)*** 
  
0.206 
(5.279)*** 
  1.715 0.828 
1962- 
2012 
L 
 
0.024 
(4.180)*** 
 
0.345 
(3.284)*** 
-0.482 
(-3.605)*** 
0.523 
(5.076)*** 
  1.651 0.479 
1962- 
2012 
NL 
 
0.007 
(2.492)** 
0.255 
(2.687)*** 
 
0.448 
(3.656)*** 
 
0.152 
(4.599)*** 
 1.997 0.801 
1962- 
2012 
P 
 
0.018 
(3.200)*** 
0.471 
(7.345)*** 
  
0.204 
(4.035)*** 
0.247 
(4.491)*** 
 1.803 0.857 
1962- 
2012 
E 
 
0.029 
(2.904)*** 
 
0.585 
(8.027)*** 
 
0.023 
(1.093) 
 
0.798 
(8.667)*** 
2.284 0.937 
1962- 
2012 
S 
 
0.016 
(2.914)*** 
0.342 
(4.107)*** 
  
0.151 
(3.926)*** 
(0.220) 
(5.499)*** 
 1.951 0.817 
1962- 
2012 
UK 
 
0.016 
(2.968)*** 
0.582 
(7.530)*** 
  
`0.184 
(3.048)*** 
  1.715 0.695 
1962- 
2012 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Table 4. Export price deflator: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑥) 
 c 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷𝒙𝒕−𝟏) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷𝒎𝒕) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
 (𝑷𝒎𝒕 − 𝟏) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷𝒙𝒕−𝟏) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕−𝟏)   
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷𝒎𝒕−𝟏) 
(𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
0.002 
(1.060) 
 
0.152 
(3.490)*** 
 
0.616 
(15.385)*** 
     2.339 0.867 
1961- 
2013 
B 
 
0.001 
(0.674) 
 
0.096 
(1.920)* 
 
0.789 
(26.133)*** 
     2.037 0.949 
1961- 
2013 
DK 
 
1.307 
(4.828)*** 
 
0.085 
(1.031) 
 
0.687 
(15.211)*** 
 
-0.643 
(-4.950)*** 
0.223 
(4.748)*** 
0.385 
(4.642)*** 
 2.045 0.916 
1961- 
2013 
FIN 
 
-0.003 
(-0.811) 
 
0.185 
(2.612)*** 
 
0.776 
(15.279)*** 
     1.569 0.879 
1961- 
2013 
F 
 
-0.002 
(-1.025) 
0.248 
(4.124)*** 
 
0.142 
(3.074)*** 
0.528 
(21.465)*** 
     1.875 0.956 
1962- 
2013 
D 
 
0.004 
(1.653)* 
0.197 
(3.122)*** 
 
0.224 
(3.227)*** 
0.365 
(11.266)*** 
     1.667 0.823 
1962- 
2013 
GR 
 
1.115 
(3.237)*** 
 
0.154 
(1.631) 
 
0.828 
(12.355)*** 
 
-0.511 
(-4.341)*** 
0.192 
(3.250)*** 
0.297 
(3.536)*** 
 1.880 0.914 
1961- 
2013 
IRL 
 
0.000 
(0.009) 
 
0.171 
(1.946)* 
 
0.708 
(10.398)*** 
     2.004 0.810 
1961- 
2013 
I 
 
0.000 
(0.113) 
0.185 
(3.179)*** 
 
0.539 
(19.040)*** 
0.210 
(3.630)*** 
    
-0.315 
(-2.029)** 
1.980 0.950 
1963- 
2013 
L 
 
0.024 
(2.389)** 
0.322 
(1.704)* 
   
-0.001 
(-0.006) 
    1.800 0.076 
1962- 
2013 
NL 
 
0.002 
(0.251) 
0.370 
(1.823)* 
   
0.229 
(1.877)* 
    2.008 0.171 
1962- 
2013 
P 
 
0.280 
(1.786)* 
-0.103 
(-1.658)* 
 
0.246 
(1.845)* 
0.722 
(14.862)*** 
-0.251 
(-2.301)** 
-0.382 
(-4.404)*** 
0.053 
(1.971)** 
0.330 
(5.082)*** 
 1.834 0.930 
1962- 
2013 
E 
 
0.012 
(1.483) 
0.255 
(2.507)** 
 
0.155 
(1.716)* 
      1.620 0.884 
1963- 
2013 
S 
 
-0.002 
(-0.616) 
 
0.172 
(2.509)** 
 
0.716 
(16.126)*** 
     1.928 0.877 
1961- 
2013 
UK 
 
0.558 
(3.051)*** 
 
0.136 
(2.084)** 
 
0.577 
(13.998)*** 
 
-0.486 
(-4.725)*** 
0.101 
(3.172)*** 
0.377 
(4.975)*** 
 1.667 0.928 
1961- 
2013 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Table 5. Exports: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑋) 
 c 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒙/𝑷𝒎)𝒕−𝟏 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒙/𝑷𝒎)𝒕 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝒀𝒓𝒘𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒆𝒕) (𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
-0.028 
(-2.813)*** 
 
-1.728 
(-5.717)*** 
2.314 
(9.008)*** 
  1.778 0.676 
1961- 
2013 
B 
 
-0.029 
(-3.264)*** 
 
-0.185 
(-0.728) 
2.315 
(10.045)*** 
  1.876 0.669 
1961- 
2013 
DK 
 
-0.004 
(-0.483) 
 
-0.627 
(-3.581)*** 
1.540 
(6.445)*** 
  1.718 0.472 
1961- 
2013 
FIN 
 
-0.068 
(-3.074)*** 
 
-0.576 
(-2.003)** 
3.428 
(6.415)*** 
 
3.077 
(0.430) 
2.121 0.486 
1962- 
2013 
F 
 
-0.020 
(-1.718)* 
 
-0.439 
(-3.075)*** 
2.155 
(7.689)*** 
0.158 
(1.665)* 
0.371 
(2.684)*** 
2.194 0.725 
1962- 
2013 
D 
 
-0.017 
(-1.145) 
-0.379 
(-1.876)* 
 
2.136 
(5.376)*** 
  2.022 0.372 
1962- 
2013 
GR 
 
-0.037 
(-1.342) 
-0.729 
(-1.805)* 
 
2.917 
(3.968)*** 
  1.664 0.305 
1962- 
2013 
IRL 
 
0.043 
(2.223)** 
 
-0.178 
(-0.903) 
1.041 
(2.155)** 
 
0.351 
(2.608)*** 
1.896 0.189 
1962- 
2013 
I 
 
-0.053 
(-3.811)*** 
-0.307 
(-1.994)** 
 
3.006 
(8.285)*** 
  1.966 0.586 
1962- 
2013 
L 
 
-0.033 
(-1.621) 
0.187 
(0.789) 
 
2.688 
(4.893)*** 
 
0.317 
(2.064)** 
2.102 0.388 
1963- 
2013 
NL 
 
-0.027 
(-2.681)*** 
 
-0.290 
(-1.318) 
2.445 
(10.955)*** 
 
0.559 
(4.761)*** 
2.194 0.725 
1962- 
2013 
P 
 
-0.017 
(-0.799) 
0.316 
(1.354) 
 
2.409 
(4.401)*** 
 
0.330 
(2.383)** 
1.816 0.420 
1963- 
2013 
E 
 
-0.012 
(-0.815) 
 
-0.277 
(-2.214)** 
2.448 
(6.029)*** 
  1.664 0.426 
1961- 
2013 
S 
 
-0.045 
(-3.009)*** 
 
-0.508 
(-2.915)*** 
2.715 
(7.877)*** 
 
0.497 
(3.832)*** 
2.037 0.575 
1962- 
2013 
UK 
 
0.001 
(0.152) 
 
-0.518 
(-3.708)*** 
1.174 
(4.696)*** 
  1.562 0.453 
1961- 
2013 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Table 6. Imports: dependent variable 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀) 
 c 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷/𝑷𝒎)𝒕−𝟏 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷/𝑷𝒎)𝒕 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝒀𝒕) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝒀𝒕 − 𝟏) 
𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝒎𝒕−𝟏) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝒎𝒕−𝟏) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝑷/𝑷𝒎𝒕−𝟏) 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 
(𝒀𝒕−𝟏) 
(𝑨𝑹𝟏) 𝑫𝑾 𝑹𝟐 Sample 
A 
 
-0.005 
(-0.701) 
0.329 
(1.786)* 
 
1.970 
(8.114)*** 
 
 
     2.251 0.648 
1962-
2013 
B 
 
0.004 
(0.668) 
0.336 
(3.790)*** 
 
1.649 
(8.360)*** 
 
 
    
-0.272 
(-1.917)* 
2.131 0.6921 
1963-
2013 
DK 
 
0.006 
(0.907) 
 
-0.152 
(-1.272) 
1.868 
(8.994)*** 
 
 
     2.004 0.618 
1961-
2013 
FIN 
 
-0.007 
(-0.886) 
 
-0.115 
(-0.946) 
1.854 
(10.137)*** 
 
 
     2.082 0.677 
1961-
2013 
F 
 
-0.001 
(-0.159) 
0.296 
(3.604)*** 
 
1.940 
(8.884)*** 
 
 
     2.008 0.725 
1962-
2013 
D 
 
0.007 
(0.923) 
 
0.101 
(1.098) 
2.010 
(9.666)*** 
 
 
    
0.241 
(1.728)* 
1.918 0.6841 
1963-
2013 
GR 
 
0.019 
(1.830)* 
 
0.148 
(0.772) 
1.268 
(6.884)*** 
 
 
     1.767 0.510 
1961-
2013 
IRL 
 
-1.578 
(-3.623)*** 
 
0.174 
(1.417) 
1.351 
(5.249)*** 
 
 
0.230 
(1.839)* 
-0.527 
(-4.032)** 
0.163 
(1.941)* 
0.807 
(3.909)*** 
 2.091 0.559 
1962-
2013 
I 
 
0.000 
(-0.010) 
0.195 
(2.236)** 
 
2.829 
(10.797)*** 
-0.858 
(-3.394)*** 
     2.032 0.7193 
1962-
2013 
L 
 
0.010 
(1.107) 
 
-0.025 
(-0.168) 
1.230 
(6.925)*** 
 
 
     2.146 0.490 
1961-
2013 
NL 
 
0.007 
(1.341) 
0.145 
(1.930)* 
 
1.589 
(9.536)*** 
 
 
     1.873 0.727 
1962-
2013 
P 
 
-2.121 
(-3.979)*** 
 
0.340 
(2.408)** 
1.641 
(5.161)*** 
  
-0.555 
(-4.128)** 
0.411 
(3.773)*** 
0.858 
(4.141)*** 
 1.636 0.551 
1961-
2013 
E 
 
-0.009 
(-0.769) 
0.225 
(2.073)*** 
 
2.443 
(8.171)*** 
 
 
     1.581 0.649 
1962-
2013 
S 
 
-0.009 
(-1.317) 
0.252 
(2.808)*** 
 
2.063 
(9.993)*** 
 
 
     2.210 0.678 
1962-
2013 
UK 
 
-4.300 
(-5.583)*** 
 
-0.010 
(-0.184) 
1.778 
(11.126)*** 
  
-0.594 
(-5.721)*** 
0.098 
(2.633)*** 
1.083 
(5.677)*** 
 2.114 0.798 
1961-
2013 
Notes: *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively; t-values are given in parentheses. 
A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, 
E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
  
37 
 
Table 7. The summary of the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share at the national and European level 
  
The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on:  
The effect of a 
simultaneous 1% - point 
increase in the profit share 
on % change in aggregate 
demand  C/Y I/Y X/Y M/Y NX/Y 
Private 
excess  
demand / Y Multiplier 
% Change in  
aggregate 
demand (F*G) 
  A B C D  E (C-D) F (A+B+E) G H I 
A -0.277 0.000 0.234 -0.161 0.396 0.119 1.039 0.124 -0.185 
B -0.151 0.206 0.000 -0.053 0.053 0.108 0.740 0.080 0.009 
DK -0.155 0.169 0.185 0.000 0.185 0.198 1.246 0.247 0.107 
FIN -0.243 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.074 -0.169 1.316 -0.222 -0.304 
F -0.324 0.101 0.062 -0.078 0.140 -0.083 1.559 -0.129 -0.228 
D -0.397 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049 -0.348 1.136 -0.395 -0.442 
GR -0.564 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.099 -0.465 1.984 -0.923 -1.027 
IRL -0.229 0.161 0.000 -0.074 0.074 0.006 0.863 0.005 -0.066 
I -0.410 0.156 0.050 -0.087 0.137 -0.117 1.451 -0.170 -0.238 
L -0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.153 0.535 -0.082 -0.128 
NL -0.322 0.078 0.000 -0.069 0.069 -0.175 0.820 -0.144 -0.191 
P -0.402 0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.182 -0.219 1.546 -0.339 -0.477 
E -0.410 0.088 0.044 -0.068 0.113 -0.210 2.147 -0.450 -0.544 
S -0.388 0.128 0.057 -0.056 0.113 -0.147 1.058 -0.155 -0.271 
UK -0.252 0.000 0.074 -0.066 0.140 -0.112 1.129 -0.126 -0.195 
EU15 GDP         -0.298* 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* The country specific growth rates from column I are multiplied with the weighted share of each country in EU15 GDP. 
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Table 8. Three wage-led recovery scenarios 
 
 
 
Scenario 1 
All countries going back to the peak wage 
share level 
 
Scenario 2 
Differentiated increase in the wage 
share in profit-led and wage-led 
countries 
Scenario 3 
Recovery to peak level in wage-led 
countries and differentiated increase in 
the wage share in profit-led countries 
Change in  
the profit 
share 
The % change in 
aggregate demand 
(including changes in 𝑃𝑚 
and 𝑌𝑟𝑤) 
Change in  
the profit 
share 
The % change in 
aggregate demand 
(including changes in 
𝑃𝑚 and 𝑌𝑟𝑤) 
Change in  
the profit 
share 
The % change in 
aggregate demand 
(including changes in 
𝑃𝑚 and 𝑌𝑟𝑤) 
A -11.734 0.92 -3.00 1.15 -3.00 1.97 
B -4.167 0.29 -1.00 0.27 -3.00 0.35 
DK -6.094 -0.34 -1.00 0.44 -3.00 0.40 
FIN -10.247 2.94 -5.00 1.49 -10.25 2.90 
F -8.452 1.92 -5.00 1.12 -8.45 1.90 
D -7.441 3.34 -5.00 2.20 -7.44 3.32 
GR -7.134 7.43 -5.00 5.12 -7.13 7.41 
IRL -21.949 0.49 -3.00 0.33 -3.00 0.58 
I -6.347 1.67 -5.00 1.18 -6.35 1.65 
L -3.012 0.64 -5.00 0.64 -3.01 0.64 
NL -8.948 1.69 -5.00 0.95 -8.95 1.68 
P -18.278 7.53 -5.00 2.38 -18.28 7.51 
E -12.683 6.47 -5.00 2.71 -12.68 6.45 
S -7.488 2.11 -5.00 1.28 -7.49 2.02 
UK -8.692 1.70 -5.00 0.96 -8.69 1.65 
EU 15 GDP* 2.56 1.51 3.15 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* EU15 GDP is calculated by multiplying country specific growth rates with the weighted share of each country in EU15 GDP.  
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Table 9. The effects of a differentiated increase in the wage share on investment and net exports 
 
Based on 
Differentiated increase in the wage share 
in profit-led and wage-led countries 
 
Investment Regime 
Total effects of a differentiated increase 
in the wage share on investment  
 
Trade Balance Effects 
Total effects of a differentiated increase 
in the wage share on net exports 
 
 Change in  
profit share 
The % change in aggregate 
demand  
Total effect on 𝐼 𝑌⁄  Total effect on 𝑁𝑋 𝑌⁄  
A B C D 
A -3.00 1.15 0.431 -0.419 
B -1.00 0.27 -0.138 0.202 
DK -1.00 0.44 0.020 0.153 
FIN -5.00 1.49 0.647 -0.758 
F -5.00 1.12 -0.053 -0.753 
D -5.00 2.20 0.684 -0.913 
GR -5.00 5.12 2.358 -1.404 
IRL -3.00 0.33 -0.379 -0.052 
I -5.00 1.18 -0.409 -0.842 
L -5.00 0.64 0.167 -0.355 
NL -5.00 0.95 -0.225 -0.641 
P -5.00 2.38 0.895 -1.004 
E -5.00 2.71 1.024 -1.303 
S -5.00 1.28 -0.095 -0.812 
UK -5.00 0.96 0.144 -0.756 
Average*  1.51 0.24 -0.793 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
 * The country specific growth rates in column B and changes in investment and net exports in column C, D are each multiplied with the weighted share of each country in 
EU15 GDP. 
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Appendix A - Data Sources 
Time-series 
data 
Variable Definition 
Source  
[Variable construction] 
Adjusted wage 
share 
 
𝑤𝑠 
 
Compensation per 
employee as percentage of 
GDP at factor cost per 
person employed 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Adjusted profit 
share 
𝜋  [𝜋 = 1 − 𝑤𝑠] 
GDP in market 
prices 
(real) 
 
𝑌 
 
Gross domestic product at 
2010 market prices 
 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
GDP at factor 
costs 
(real) 
 
 
𝑌𝑓 
 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices minus taxes 
on production and 
imports, plus subsidies 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Private 
Consumption 
(real) 
 
𝐶 
 
Private final consumption 
expenditure at constant 
prices 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Adjusted 
compensation 
of employees 
(real) 
𝑊 
 
 
[𝑊 = 𝑤𝑠 ∗  𝑌𝑓] 
 
Adjusted gross 
operating surplus 
(real) 
𝑅 
 
 
[𝑅 = 𝜋 ∗ 𝑌𝑓] 
 
Total Investment 
(real) 
𝐼𝑡 
Gross fixed capital 
formation at constant 
prices; total economy 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Total investment 
(current prices) 
𝐼𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 
Gross fixed capital 
formation at current 
prices; total economy 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Private 
investment 
(current prices) 
𝐼𝑝𝑟 
Gross fixed capital 
formation at current 
prices; private sector 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Ratio of private 
to 
total investment 
𝐼𝑝𝑠 
 
 
[𝐼𝑝𝑠 = 𝐼𝑝𝑟 𝐼𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟⁄ ] 
Private 
Investment 
(real) 
𝐼  
[𝐼 = 𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑝𝑠] 
 
Real long-term 
interest rate 
𝑟 
Real long-term interest 
rates, deflator GDP 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
GDP Deflator 
 
𝑃 
 
Price deflator gross 
domestic product at market 
prices 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Import price 
deflator 
 
 
𝑃𝑚 
 
Price deflator imports of 
goods and 
services 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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Export price 
deflator 
 
 
𝑃𝑥 
 
Price deflator exports of 
goods and 
services 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Exports 
(real) 
𝑋 
Exports of goods and 
services at 
constant prices 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Imports 
(real) 
 
𝑀 
 
Imports of goods and 
services at constant prices 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Foreign GDP 
(real) 
 
 
 
𝑌𝑟𝑤 
 
 
GDP of the rest of the 
world 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI)  
http://data.worldbank.org 
[World GDP (in constant 
2005 US$) - own GDP (in 
constant 2005 US$)] 
Imports from 
country j to 
country i 
 
𝑀𝑗𝑖 
Imports from country j to 
country i 
 
 
IMF, Direction of  
Trade Statistics, 
https://stats.ukdataservice. 
ac.uk// 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
𝐸 
 
Average of local currency 
per dollar, euro, and yen 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
http://data.worldbank.org 
  
Real unit labour 
costs 
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐  [𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 = 𝑤𝑠 ∗  𝑌𝑓 𝑌⁄ ] 
Unit labour 
Costs 
𝑢𝑙𝑐 
 
 
 
[𝑢𝑙𝑐 = 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 ∗ 𝑃] 
Total factor 
productivity  
𝜏 
Total factor productivity: 
total economy 
AMECO Database 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
Notes: Private investment, real: For Luxembourg the data starts in 1990; for Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden in 1970. We have reconstructed the data assuming the ratio of private to 
total investment to stay constant. Real long-term interest rate: Data in Portugal starts in 1984, in Greece in 1972, 
in Ireland in 1970, in Spain in 1977, and in Luxembourg 1972. Imports from country j to country i: 1980-2012 
for all countries. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1. Average growth rates (percent) of GDP in EU15 countries 
 
 A B DK FIN F D GRE IRL I L NL P E S UK 
1961-69 4.5 4.8 5.2 4.5 5.7 4.4 8.5 4.4 5.8 3.8 5.0 5.5 7.7 4.4 2.9 
1970-79 4.2 3.6 2.4 4.2 4.1 3.3 5.5 4.7 4.0 2.7 3.5 5.4 3.9 2.5 2.4 
1980-89 2.0 2.2 1.9 3.7 2.4 2.0 0.8 3.1 2.6 4.6 2.0 3.4 2.7 2.3 2.5 
1990-99 2.7 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.1 7.0 1.5 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.7 1.8 2.7 
2000-07 2.4 2.2 1.9 3.5 2.1 1.6 4.1 5.5 1.5 4.4 2.3 1.5 3.8 3.2 3.0 
2008-2013 0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.8 0.3 0.6 -4.8 -1.1 -1.4 0.8 -0.1 -1.2 -1.1 0.7 0.2 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
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Appendix C 
In order to eventually sum up the individual effects across different components of demand and find 
∆𝑌/𝑌 as a response to a 1-percentage point increase in 𝜋 (𝑅 𝑌⁄ ), we are interested in the marginal 
effects, rather than elasticites. Following Stockhammer et al. (2009) we thus convert elasticities to 
marginal effects. In the case of consumption, the elasticities are 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝑊 in equation (1) respectively. 
Note that in Equation (1) 𝑐𝑅is estimated for a given W. The same is true for 𝑐𝑊 where the elasticity is 
estimated for a given R. Hence: 
                  𝑐𝑅 =
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅
|
𝑊
≅
𝜕𝐶
𝐶
𝜕𝑅
𝑅
|
𝑊
⁄ =
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑅
𝑅
𝐶
|
𝑊
                                        
(C1) 
and 
         𝑐𝑊 =
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊
|
𝑅
≅
𝜕𝐶
𝐶
𝜕𝑊
𝑊
|
𝑅
⁄ =
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑊
𝑊
𝐶
|
𝑅
                                    (C2) 
 
Multiplying and dividing equation (C1) and (C2) by 𝑌 gives 
     𝑐𝑅 =
𝜕𝐶 𝑌⁄
𝜕𝑅 𝑌⁄
𝑅
𝐶
|
𝑊
                                                             (C3) 
 
and 
     𝑐𝑊 =
𝜕𝐶 𝑌⁄
𝜕𝑊 𝑌⁄
𝑊
𝐶
|
𝑅
                                                           (C4) 
 
Calculating the marginal effects gives 
     
𝜕𝐶 𝑌⁄
𝜕𝑅 𝑌⁄
|
𝑊
= 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
𝑅
|
𝑊
                                                       (C5) 
and 
 
     
𝜕𝐶 𝑌⁄
𝜕𝑊 𝑌⁄
|
𝑅
= 𝑐𝑊
𝐶
𝑊
|
𝑅
                                                       (C6) 
 
Since we know that 𝑊 𝑌 = 1 − 𝑅 𝑌⁄⁄ , we can say that, for a given Y (prior to any multiplier effects), 
whenever there is an increase in R/Y there is an equivalent fall in W/Y. The aggregate effect combines 
these effects for an initially constant Y: 
     
∆𝐶 𝑌⁄
∆𝑅 𝑌⁄
= 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
𝑅
− 𝑐𝑊
𝐶
𝑊
                                                    (C7) 
 
In converting the elasticities to marginal effects, we multiply the estimated elasticities of R and W by 
the mean values of C/R and C/W, respectively, for the whole sample. The initial changes in 𝐶 and 𝐼 will 
lead to changes in demand and output, this in turn will lead to further changes in 𝐶 and 𝐼 through the 
multiplier mechanism as discussed in appendix D.  
 
In the case of Investment, 𝑖𝜋 in equation (3) is the elasticity of I with respect to 𝜋(𝑅/𝑌), hence: 
                                          𝑖𝜋 =
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼
𝜕log (𝑅/𝑌)
≅
𝜕𝐼
𝐼
 
𝜕(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
=
𝜕𝐼
𝜕(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
𝑅 𝑌⁄
𝐼
⁄                             (C8) 
 
Multiplying and dividing by 𝑌, we obtain 
                                                     𝑖𝜋 =
𝜕𝐼
𝜕(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
𝑌
𝑌
𝑅 𝑌⁄
𝐼
=
𝜕𝐼 𝑌⁄
𝜕(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
𝑅
𝐼
                                             (C9) 
 
 
Hence, the marginal effect of R/Y on I/Y is:  
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∆𝐼 𝑌⁄
 ∆(𝑅 𝑌⁄ )
= 𝑖𝜋
𝐼
𝑅
                                               (C10) 
 
In converting the elasticity to the marginal effect on I/Y, we use the mean value of 𝐼 𝑅⁄  for the whole 
sample. 
 
Appendix D 
In order to simulate the case of a simultaneous fall in the wage share we can decompose the effects of 
a change in the profit shares in all countries to national and European effects. The total effect is given 
by: 
                    
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
= 𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + 𝐻𝑛𝑥𝑛
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
+ 𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛 [
∆𝜋1
⋮
∆𝜋𝑛
] + 𝑊𝑛𝑥𝑛
⌊
 
 
 
∆𝑌1
𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
                             (D1) 
where 𝐸 is a diagonal 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix, where the diagonal elements are the effect of a change in the profit 
share in country i on private excess demand in country i, calculated as in equations (2), (4), (9) and (10). 
                                𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝐶
𝑌1
+
∆𝐼
𝑌1
+
∆𝑁𝑋
𝑌1
∆𝜋1
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ ⋯
∆𝐶
𝑌𝑛
+
∆𝐼
𝑌𝑛
+
∆𝑁𝑋
𝑌𝑛
∆𝜋𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
(D2) 
𝐻 is an 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 diagonal matrix, which shows the effect of a change in aggregate demand on private 
excess demand in each country and reflects the national multiplier: 
 
                      𝐻𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
∆𝐶1
∆𝑌1
+
∆𝐼1
∆𝑌1
−
∆𝑀1
∆𝑌1
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ ⋯ ⋮
⋮ … ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ ⋯
∆𝐶𝑛
∆𝑌𝑛
+
∆𝐼𝑛
∆𝑌𝑛
−
∆𝑀𝑛
∆𝑌𝑛 ⌋
 
 
 
 
                                    (D3) 
 
Any change in private demand in country i will lead to a multiplier mechanism in that country that is it 
will affect consumption, investment, and imports. The coefficient estimates in tables 1, 2 and 6 give the 
elasticities of 𝐶, 𝐼, and 𝑀 with respect to 𝑌 (𝑒𝐶𝑌, 𝑒𝐼𝑌, 𝑒𝑀𝑌).  
 
For the elasticity of C with respect to 𝑌, 𝑒𝐶𝑌, there is need for further calculation: 𝑒𝐶𝑌 is calculated as 
𝑒𝐶𝑅𝜋 + 𝑒𝐶𝑊(1 − 𝜋), where 𝑒𝐶𝑅 and 𝑒𝐶𝑊 are the elasticity of C with respect to profit and wage income 
respectively. Thus 𝑒𝐶𝑌 is a weighted average of the elasticities of C with respect to 𝑅 and 𝑊, where 
weights are the shares of 𝑅 and 𝑊 in 𝑌 (at sample mean).  
 
The elasticities have to be converted into partial effects, for example:  
                                   𝑒𝐶𝑌,𝑖 = 
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖
≅ 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑖
= 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝐶𝑖
                                                        (D4) 
 
Hence, 
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𝜕𝐶𝑖
 𝜕𝑌𝑖
= 𝑒𝐶𝑌,𝑖
𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑖
                                                                            
(D5) 
 
Finally,  
                             𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
−
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
= 𝑒𝐶𝑌,𝑖
𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑖
+ 𝑒𝐼𝑌,𝑖
𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑖
− 𝑒𝑀𝑌,𝑖
𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑖
.                                       (D6) 
 
If we assume that the change in the profit share is isolated to a single country, then in order to find the 
total effects of a change in 𝜋𝑖 on equilibrium aggregate demand in country i, private excess demand 
(𝐸𝑖𝑖) has to be multiplied by the standard multiplier: 
               
∆𝑌𝑖/𝑌𝑖
∆𝜋𝑖
= 
(
𝜕(𝐶𝑖/𝑌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕(𝐼𝑖/𝑌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
(𝜕𝑁𝑋𝑖/𝑌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
)
1− (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
−
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
+
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
)
= 
𝐸𝑖𝑖
1−𝐻𝑖𝑖
                          (D7) 
 
The numerator is private excess demand, that is, the change in private demand caused by a change in 
income distribution, for a given level of income. The term 1/ 1 − (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
−
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
+
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑖
) in equation (D7) 
is the standard multiplier and is expected to be positive for stability.  
 
The last two matrices in Equation (D1) reflect the European effects when there is a simultaneous change 
in π in all EU15 countries. 𝑃 is a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix, which shows the effects of a change in a trade partner’s 
profit share, 𝜋𝑗, on net exports in each country i: 
                    𝑃𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)
1
𝜕𝜋2
𝑀21
𝑀1
⋯
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)
1
𝜕𝜋𝑛
𝑀𝑛1
𝑀1
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)
2
𝜕𝜋1
𝑀12
𝑀2
0 … ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)
𝑛
𝜕𝜋1
𝑀1𝑛
𝑀𝑛
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)
𝑛
𝜕𝜋2
𝑀2𝑛
𝑀𝑛
⋯ 0 ⌋
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             (D8) 
 
The diagonal elements of 𝑃 are zero, the off-diagonal elements are calculated as: 
                   𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 
𝜕(
𝑁𝑋
𝑌
)𝑖
∆𝜋𝑗
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑖
= (𝑒𝑃𝑥𝑗
1
1−𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑗
𝑌𝑗
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑗
)
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑖
(𝑒𝑋𝑃𝑖
𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑖
− 𝑒𝑀𝑃𝑖  
𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑖
)                              (D9) 
 
The terms in the first parenthesis shows the effect of a change in the profit share in country j on its 
export prices, based on elasticities from equation (9). This change is weighted by the share of imports 
from country j to country i in country i’s total imports to reflect the effect on country i’s overall import 
prices. The last term calculates the effects of this change in import prices on country i’s exports – 
imports (using the elasticities of 𝑋 and 𝑀 to 𝑃𝑥/𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃/𝑃𝑚 respectively), each weighted by the share 
of exports and imports in GDP.  
 
𝑊 is an 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrix, which shows the effects of a change in a trade partner’s GDP on the exports of 
each country:  
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      𝑊𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 
⌊
 
 
 
 
 0 𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,1
𝑋1
𝑌1
𝑌2
𝑌𝑤
⋯ 𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,1
𝑋1
𝑌1
𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑤
𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,2
𝑋2
𝑌2
𝑌1
𝑌𝑤
0 … 𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,2
𝑋2
𝑌2
𝑌𝑛
𝑌𝑤
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,𝑛
𝑋𝑛
𝑌𝑛
𝑌1
𝑌𝑤
𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,𝑛
𝑋𝑛
𝑌𝑛
𝑌2
𝑌𝑤
⋯ 0 ⌋
 
 
 
 
 
                     (D10) 
 
The diagonal elements of this matrix are zero, and the off-diagonal element, 𝑊𝑖𝑗, reflects the effect of 
a change in country j’s income on country i’s exports (as a ratio to GDP), and is calculated as the 
elasticity of exports of country i with respect to the GDP of the rest of the world (𝑒𝑋𝑌𝑟𝑤,𝑖) multiplied by 
the share of exports in GDP in country i and weighted by the share of country j in world GDP (𝑌𝑤).  
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Appendix E 
Table E1. Calculation of the marginal effect of a 1 percentage-point increase in the profit share on net exports 
  
Exports Imports Sum 
𝑒(𝑃) 
1
1 − 𝑒(𝑃)
 𝑒(𝑃𝑋) 𝑒(𝑋𝑃) 𝑒𝑋. 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝑌𝑓/𝑌 𝑋/𝑌 
𝜕𝑋/𝑌
𝜕𝜋
 𝑒(𝑀, 𝑃) 𝑒(𝑀, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐) (𝑀/𝑌) 
𝜕𝑀/𝑌
𝜕𝜋
 
𝜕𝑁𝑋/𝑌
𝜕𝜋
 
A B C D E (B*C*D) F G H I(-E*G*H/F) J K(A*B*J) L M(-K*G*L/F) I-M 
A 0.524 2.099 0.152 -1.728 -0.551 0.599 0.874 0.291 0.234 0.329 0.361 0.306 -0.161 0.396 
B 0.180 1.220 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.603 0.897 0.491 0.000 0.336 0.074 0.487 -0.053 0.053 
DK 0.465 1.870 0.347 -0.627 -0.406 0.582 0.866 0.305 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.185 
FIN 0.516 2.067 0.185 -0.576 -0.220 0.608 0.890 0.230 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.074 
F 0.529 2.121 0.289 -0.439 -0.269 0.602 0.869 0.161 0.062 0.296 0.332 0.163 -0.078 0.140 
D 0.382 1.617 0.253 -0.379 -0.155 0.600 0.913 0.207 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.049 
GR 0.423 1.734 0.377 -0.729 -0.476 0.547 0.908 0.125 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.099 
IRL 0.256 1.344 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.896 0.455 0.000 0.310 0.107 0.456 -0.074 0.074 
I 0.633 2.723 0.235 -0.307 -0.196 0.586 0.913 0.165 0.050 0.195 0.336 0.165 -0.087 0.137 
L 0.232 1.303 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.521 0.930 1.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.000 
NL 0.461 1.855 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.916 0.428 0.000 0.145 0.124 0.385 -0.069 0.069 
P 0.471 1.889 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.638 0.913 0.161 0.000 0.741 0.659 0.194 -0.182 0.182 
E 0.585 2.410 0.301 -0.277 -0.201 0.614 0.913 0.149 0.044 0.225 0.318 0.144 -0.068 0.113 
S  0.342 1.519 0.172 -0.508 -0.132 0.517 0.815 0.273 0.057 0.252 0.131 0.273 -0.056 0.113 
UK 0.582 2.393 0.207 -0.518 -0.257 0.612 0.890 0.199 0.074 0.165 0.230 0.198 -0.066 0.140 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
The marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on exports and imports is -1*the effect of a 1%-point increase in the wage share on exports and imports. Therefore, 
in columns I and M, the values coming from E and K are multiplied by -1. 
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Appendix F 
Table F1.  Elasticities of C, I, M with respect to Y and the Multiplier 
 
 𝒆𝑪𝒀 𝒆𝑰𝒀 𝒆𝑴𝒀 h Multiplier 
Austria 0.473 1.881 1.970 0.038 1.039 
Belgium 0.373 1.334 1.649 -0.351 0.740 
Denmark 0.517 2.929 1.868 0.197 1.246 
Finland 0.492 2.067 1.854 0.240 1.316 
France 0.499 2.214 1.940 0.358 1.559 
Germany 0.348 1.810 2.010 0.120 1.136 
Greece 0.427 2.293 1.268 0.496 1.984 
Ireland 0.404 1.802 1.531 -0.158 0.863 
Italy 0.550 1.722 1.970 0.311 1.451 
Luxembourg 0.242 1.728 1.230 -0.870 0.535 
Netherlands 0.448 0.985 1.589 -0.219 0.820 
Portugal 0.457 2.119 1.547 0.353 1.546 
Spain 0.575 2.720 2.443 0.534 2.147 
Sweden 0.383 2.406 2.063 0.055 1.058 
United Kingdom 0.548 1.076 1.823 0.115 1.129 
Notes: Shows the elasticities of 𝐶, 𝐼, and 𝑀 with respect to 𝑌 as given by the coefficient estimates in table 1, 2 and 6. 
The national multiplier is calculated for each country as described in the diagonal elements of the 𝐻 matrix in appendix 
D. 
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Table G1. The effects of an isolated 1% point increase in the profit share on investment and net 
exports 
Notes: For investment, we calculate the ex-post multiplier effect taking country specific values from table 7 column 
H.  
 
Table G2. The total effects of a simultaneous 1% point increase in the profit share on investment 
and net exports 
Notes: For investment, we calculate the ex-post multiplier effect taking country specific values from table 7 column 
I.* The country specific changes in investment and net exports are each multiplied with the weighted share of each 
country in EU15 GDP. 
 
 
Total effects of an isolated 1% 
point increase in the profit share 
on investment 
Total effects of an isolated  
1% increase in the profit share  
on net exports 
Total effect on 𝐼 𝑌⁄  Total effect on 𝑁𝑋 𝑌⁄  
Austria 0.046 0.32 
Belgium 0.226 -0.01 
Denmark 0.274 0.06 
Finland -0.097 0.17 
France 0.049 0.18 
Germany -0.123 0.20 
Greece -0.425 0.31 
Ireland 0.163 0.07 
Italy 0.103 0.19 
Luxembourg -0.021 0.10 
Netherlands 0.053 0.16 
Portugal -0.128 0.26 
Spain -0.155 0.27 
Sweden 0.062 0.20 
United Kingdom -0.012 0.19 
 
Total effects of a simultaneous 
1% point increase in the profit 
share on investment 
Total effects of a simultaneous 1% 
increase in the profit share on net 
exports 
Total effect on 𝐼 𝑌⁄  Total effect on 𝑁𝑋 𝑌⁄  
Austria -0.070 0.21 
Belgium 0.208 -0.05 
Denmark 0.214 0.02 
Finland -0.132 0.15 
France 0.009 0.15 
Germany -0.138 0.18 
Greece -0.473 0.28 
Ireland 0.141 0.04 
Italy 0.081 0.17 
Luxembourg -0.033 0.07 
Netherlands 0.045 0.13 
Portugal -0.180 0.20 
Spain -0.206 0.26 
Sweden 0.012 0.16 
United Kingdom -0.029 0.15 
Average* -0.039 0.162 
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Table G3. The effect of a 1% point increase in the wage share on annual inflation and nominal 
unit labour costs 
  
  
1% point increase in the wage 
share in isolation 
 
 
 
1% point 
simultaneous 
increase in the 
wage share 
 
Differentiated 
simultaneous 
increase in the 
wage share* 
 
𝑈𝐿𝐶 Annual inflation Annual inflation Annual inflation 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝛥𝑤𝑠⁄  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 𝛥𝑤𝑠⁄  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 𝛥𝑤𝑠⁄  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 𝛥𝑤𝑠⁄  
Austria 3.062 1.603 1.652 1.008 
Belgium 1.815 0.327 0.434 0.170 
Denmark 2.785 1.296 1.374 0.335 
Finland 3.025 1.562 1.637 1.626 
France 3.059 1.617 1.681 1.674 
Germany 2.461 0.939 1.036 1.028 
Greece 2.877 1.217 1.293 1.288 
Ireland 2.049 0.525 0.612 0.398 
Italy 4.242 2.684 2.749 2.744 
Luxembourg 2.325 0.541 0.605 0.592 
Netherlands 2.680 1.235 1.282 1.276 
Portugal 2.702 1.272 1.343 1.340 
Spain 3.581 2.095 2.177 2.173 
Sweden 2.396 0.818 0.911 0.887 
United Kingdom 
3.477 2.025 2.092           2.085 
 
Average  2.836 1.317 1.392 1.242 
Notes: *The differentiated increase in ∆𝑤𝑠 is based on scenario 2 illustrated in table 8 (negation of ∆𝜋) divided by 5 
to report the annual change in ∆𝑤𝑠 and its effects on annual inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
